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IN A SPEECH PREPARED FOR SENATE DELIVERY BUT WHICH HE MADE
AVAILABLE TODAY, FRIDAY, APRIL 29, SENATOR MANSFIELD
(D., MONTANA) SAID:

Mr. President: The opposition to the nationalist government of ('{1o [>,·1'\1"- Die.._
which has never ceased in underground conspiracy and sabotage has now
come out in an open military action designed to destroy that government,
There has already been considerable fighting and bloodshed in the streets
of Saigon,
For a time the Viet Namese government appeared to be making
some progress in consolidating the non-communist position in south Viet
Nam,

Headed by Ngo Dien Diem, that government has had the full coopera-

tion of the United States.
The Diem government made clear from its inception that it was
dedicated to the independence and welfare of the people of Viet Nam,
Because it was, it antagonized powerful forces, native and otherwise,
in Saigon-Cholon,

For the first time, the Viet Minh communist forces

in the north found themselves confronted with an opposition which had
some chance of capturing the loyalties of the Viet Namese people which
they had monopolized by default prior to its advent.
As members of the Senate may recall, I have visited Viet Nam
during the course of two study missions in Indochina and have reported
my observations to the Committee on Foreign Relations,

I have also

spoken on the situation in Indochina from time to time in this body.
I have not been in Viet Nam since last September, and I do not
know the full details of the present crisis.

I assume that the President

- 2 and the Secretary of State do have those details since they bear responsibility
for fitting our policy to developments in Viet Nam.
Recent news reports from Saigon and elsewhere, however, do give
a general picture of what has been going on in south Viet Nam.

They tell

of French dissatisfaction with the Diem government and the bitter animosity
of various sects and other groups towards that government because of its
attempts to curtail their independent power and revenue.

The Diem govern-

ment has been portrayed for weeks as on the verge of overthrow, with its
Premier unable to consolidate his authority in the country.
They also tell of the incredibly sordid situation which the nationalist
government inherited after the Geneva truce.
the south and the callous corruption in Saigon.

They tell of the near-anarchy in
They do not tell of the constant

efforts to undercut the government by an under-cover conspiracy that operates
back and forth between the French Riviera and the city of Saigon-Cholon.
Now that conspiracy has finally come out in the open.

V!e see the

incredible spectacle of the Premier of the Government, Ngo Dien Diem, being
summoned to Paris in the midst of a revolt precipitated by racketeers,

We sec

the incredible spectacle of a military leader who had sought refuge among the
racketeers being appointed by a Chief of State in Cannes over the head of the
premier as commander of the national army which is supposed to suppress
the racketeer's revolt.
There is nothing new in this picture. except the open fighting.

It is pre·

cisely the kind of situation with which the Diem government has had to contend
since the outset.
r:lu~i0"'9

There is nothing in it which would lead me to revise the con-

which t reacher! }?rt vear.

Or. Oct,...J..,...,. 1C:t-l-.

! reported

thrH:~ ("'Onclu ~

- 3 sions to the Committee on Foreign Relations.

I should like to re-emphasize

them at this time by reading pertinent sections:
A year ago, the principal requirements for the
success of our policy with respect to Indochina were political.
These requirements, full independence and effective internal
goverment, notably in Vietnam, have not been effectively
fulfilled. The failure in this respect appears also to have been
accompanied by a consistent unde restimati ng of both the political
and military strength of the Vietminh, on the part of practically
all concerned. In consequence, the situation has seriously
dete riorated.
The United States shares responsibility for the reversal in Indochi na. We should not make the mistake, however,
of assuming all the blame. We gave material aid unstintingly,
but its value was dissipated by inadequacies elsewhere. I
report this, not so ;much in criticism- -I am fully aware of the
great contributions to the common cause made by sincere French
officials and sincere Vietnamese nationalists--but rather to make
clear that this country has discharged the commitments which it
was asked to make last year and which it agreed to make. At
that time it was not asked to commit and was even discouraged
from committing manpower in Indochina. Not until the crisis
of Dien Bien Phu did the question even arise. Then the pressures of American opinion operating largely through Congress
discouraged a hasty, ill-conceived involvement. Our share in
the defense of Indochina was clearly understood at the outset to
be the supply of material aid only and we quite properly insisted
that this understanding be maintained. The situation in Indochina is only one of the many crises that confront us and the
burden of sustaining freedom in the world must be equitably
borne.
At present, there appears to be, at best, scant hope of
achieving the objectives of our policy in Indochina in the near
future, with Cambodia the only exception to this conclusion. The
present Government of Vietnau~ which is based on the sound
principles of national independence, an end to corruption and
internal amelioration, is immobilized largely by a squabbling
plotting opposition. Its critics complain of the personality of
the leader of that Government. In view of the numerous and
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varied personalities w'-lo have occupied the Presidency in
Saigon during the past 2 or 3 years without tangible results,
it seems more likely that the real queshon is one of
dissatisfaction with the prmciples of the Diem government
rather than the inadequacies of his personality.
Should the Diem government be forced out of office, it
is doubtful that under the pressure of time a more satisfactory,
substitute, subscribing to the same principles to which he does,
will be found. Yet these principles must prevail in south
Vietnam , if an alternative to the Communist Vietminh that is
likely to be acceptable to the people of Vietnam is to exist.
Any replacement of Diem at thjs time, if it occurs, will
probably take the form of a military dictator ship based upon
a coalition of the special interests, parties, and groups which
now oppose the present Government. It is improbable that
the substitute will be the kind of government which will be
generally supported by the Vietnamese people any more than
the pre-Diem governments were. Nor is it likely to be a
government capable of sustaining a free and independent
Vietnam eventually without foreign support. It was to develop
that kind of Vietnam that the United States made available
hundreds of millions of dollars of ajd, In my view, only that
kind of Vietnam can achieve the purpose of our policy in
Indochina which, in the final analysis, is its freedom and the
consequent enhancement of our own security.
In the event that the Diem government falls, therefore,
I believe that the United States shocld consider an immediate
suspension of all aid to Vietnam and the French Union forces
there, except that of a humanitarian nature, preliminary to a
complete reappraisal of our present policies in Fl"'ee Vietnam,
Unless there is reasonable expectation of fulfilling our objectives the continued expenditure of the resources of the citizens
of the United States is unwarranted and inexcusable.
Two parts of those conclusions should be underlined in connection
with the presPnt: crisis.

They bear directly on it.

- 5 1. Should the Diem government be forced out of office, it is
doubtful that a more satisfactory substitute subscribing to the
same principles which he does, will be found. Yet those
principles must prevail in south Vietnam, if an alternative
to the Communist Vietminh that is likely to be acceptable to
the people of Vietnam is to exist.
and
2. In the event that the Diem Government falls, I believe
that the United States should consider an immediate suspension of all aid to Vietnam and the French Union forces
there, except that of a humanitarian nature, preliminary to
a complete reappraisal of our present policies in Free
Vietnam.
A showdown in Saigon is now in progress.
side issues in this struggle.

I know that there are

I know that it has been contended and perhaps

correctly that Diem is to o uncompromising in his dealings with other
political leaders who are inclined towards the nationalist cause.

Basically,

however, the showdown is between two sets of forces in VietNam.

The

one, presently personified by Diem, stands for a decent and honest government in an independent Viet Nam.

The military power aligned against it is

based on those who have little concept of, little concern, or downright contempt for what these terms mean.

Diem has recently expressed his intention

of holding elections as a first step towards representative government.
opposes these elections?

Vvho

Those, apparently, whose power is not based on the

consent of the people over whom it is exercised.

The opponents of the Diem

government have power but it is a power built largely on corruption and the
fear that their private armed forces inspire. It is the power of t.ht'! Black Hand.
the pirate,

th~

mercenary, the racketeer. and the witch rloctor,

-6If the

forces standing for decency and honesty and genuine

national independence fail in this crisis, the cause of human freedom in
Asia will not gain.
gain.

This country will not gain.

France will not really

Even those Vietnamese who help to bring about the downfall of

the government, in the long run, w1ll not gain.

Only the Communists will

gain.
It is possible that a semblance of stability may be produced i:1

Saigon if a coalition of the corrupt under a thin veneer of respectability
replaces the present government.

Beneath the surface, however, the

penetration of communism will go on inevitably.
My view of the present crisis remains as I expressed it in the
conclusions of the report which I read today.

Current developments

seem to me only to emphasize the pertinence of those conclusions,
It is possible that the Executive Branch has information on the

situation in south VietNam going far beyond that which is currently
appearing in the press.

General Collins, who has been doing a

difficult job with superb devotion to duty, in support of the Diem government,
has just reported to the President and the Secretary of State.

It may be

that in time this body will be advised of facts which we do not now have.
It may be that the President and the Secretary of State will find it
necessary to alter the present direction of our policy in VietNam.
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That is entirely possible and, if it is the case, it certainly lies
within their responsibility to make the necessary adjustments.

I am

confident, however, that this government will not align itself with the kind of
forces which are now in military and conspiratorial opposition to Diem.
The expenditure of hundreds of millions of dollars in support of those forces
would be, it seems to me, entirely unwarranted.

I believe the American

people would expect an explanation which will show how any such expenditures
could contribute to the national interests of this country. It would be the
responsibility of the Gong res s to see that they get it.

Our national interests

with respect to VietNam can be furthered only if our policies serve to lead
to a VietNamese government which is independent and which can put down
solid roots in the Viet Namese populace.

